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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse and evaluate the deployment of smart platforms (op-
erated by distribution system operators—DSOs—or by independent parties) in key jurisdictions 
that facilitate the trading of flexibility services—primarily by DSOs. We look at key innovation pro-
jects/initiatives from seven jurisdictions, including Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, 
The Netherlands and Norway. We have deliberately selected 13 use cases that operate under differ-
ent regulatory frameworks and market rules, and have been recently implemented (from 2017 on-
wards). With the selection of key use cases this study seeks to discuss the different smart architec-
ture solutions and main capabilities across different demonstrators and their relationship to busi-
ness as usual. It also analyses flexibility market designs, identifies main characteristics, and com-
pares different price formation schemes and procurement methods. The value of flexibility for DSOs 
is also discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
The decentralisation, decarbonisation and digitalisation of the energy system is cre-
ating new business opportunities for all the participants in the electricity value chain, such 
as suppliers, demand customers, traders, aggregators and network operators (e.g., distri-
bution system operators—DSOs—and transmission system operators—TSOs). The de-
mocratisation of smart technologies (e.g., smart meters, artificial intelligence, active net-
work management, blockchain) in the different components of the electricity supply chain 
is facilitating the management and trading of different flexibility services provided by 
distributed energy resources (DER) including demand customers. Flexibility is defined as 
“the modification of generation, injection and/or consumption patterns in reaction to an 
external signal (price signal of activation) in order to provide a service within the energy 
system” ([1], p. 5). There is not a unique definition of DER, but DER refer often to small-
scale power generation (renewables and non-renewables), storage (including EV batter-
ies), demand response and controllable loads connected to the distribution system. 
Flexibility contributes to a more efficient and reliable operation of the electricity net-
work and also to the decarbonisation of the electricity system if this comes from DER. In 
line with the theme of this special issue, these services are often being procured by leading 
electricity distribution utilities as part of innovation projects. 
These services can be traded in two ways. The first one is between consumers and 
prosumers within the same local networks (i.e., within a single community) or at large 
scale (i.e., within a group of communities). These are commonly known as peer-to peer 
(P2P). Under this scheme, prosumers or flexibility providers may be part of an isolated 
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network (i.e., microgrids) or be connected to the distribution network [2]. In the classic 
P2P an interconnected platform allows sellers and buyers to trade renewable energy with 
no intermediaries at the agreed price. Some examples of P2P are: Brooklyn Microgrid in 
USA [3], sonnenCommunity in Germany [4], Vandebron in the Netherlands [5]. The sec-
ond one is within conventional wholesale and retail markets (i.e., end-consumers and 
DER with the capability to interact with the grid, usually aggregated in order to meet grid 
requirements). In this case, DSOs can contract flexibility services using different ap-
proaches (see the next paragraph for details). 
These two approaches refer to P2P platforms and grid services platforms, respec-
tively [6]. This paper is focused on the second approach. Many of the different grid re-
quirements can be in the form of congestion management and ancillary services. For in-
stance, in the wholesale market, these requirements have been traditionally provided by 
the supply side (i.e., transmission- connected generators) and procured by electricity sys-
tem operators using different mechanisms [7]. However, the deployment of decentralised 
generation and the transition from passive to active consumers, encourage the participa-
tion of new market players in the provision of flexibility services to the grid. Regulation 
and appropriate auction market designs can also increase the participation of decentral-
ised flexibility such as DER, especially if aggregation of multiple small units is allowed 
and key roles in the electricity supply chain are extended [8,9]. 
DSOs are expanding their options for contracting flexibility services from DER and 
active consumers connected to their networks. This can take different forms: directly (i.e., 
single or aggregated units), via a common trading platform that involves several distribu-
tion utilities (e.g., Piclo Flex) or via a common platform for DSOs and TSOs who can re-
ceive bids for flexibility services simultaneously (e.g., GOPACS, Nodes). Regulation and 
policies that promote the trading of flexibility services from DER is still a work in progress 
in many jurisdictions [10]. Many of the current initiatives are still under development, 
with an important number of demonstrators that aim to evaluate their economic, technical 
and commercial viability. 
In Europe, this deployment is supported by the European Commission in the latest 
Clean Energy Package that entitles DSOs to procure flexibility using a market-based ap-
proach in coordination with TSOs, especially for local congestion management and non-
frequency ancillary services, see Directive (EU) 2019/944 [11]. The Council of European 
Energy Regulators (CEER) has adopted also a similar approach [12]. According to this 
Directive (Art. 32), member states shall provide incentives to DSOs for the use of flexibil-
ity, as an alternative to conventional solutions such as network upgrades, when flexibility 
is more economically efficient. DSOs shall be remunerated accordingly. They are also re-
quired to contract flexibility services from different market participants using a non-dis-
criminatory approach. This Directive (Art. 15) also stresses the participation of active con-
sumers in flexibility schemes, also suggesting fair treatment in terms of network charges, 
how they operate (directly or via aggregators), trade the services, etc. Something that is 
less explored is the role of energy communities (which encourages collective participation 
of active consumers) in the participation of local flexibility schemes to alleviate network 
constraints. Most of the current initiatives remained engaged with generation [13]. How-
ever the Clean Energy Package enables a supportive regulatory framework for the de-
ployment of energy communities. 
Competition in flexibility services can be also supported by unbundling rules that 
aim at the separation of the vertically integrated energy firm from activities not related to 
distribution, see Directive (EU) 2019/944 (Art. 35), with some exceptions depending on the 
type of asset, such as storage facilities (Art. 36). There is a risk of discrimination in the 
sense that DSOs may have preferences for their own assets rather than the ones owned by 
third parties when contracting flexibility services, which may preclude fair competition. 
The current literature in local flexibility markets is diverse. Some of the studies look 
at market design for flexibility to solve network constraints (i.e., in the form of congestion 
management); both at distribution and transmission levels [14–18]. Here we observe a 
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combination of country-level and regional analysis mainly limited to Europe, with pilots 
and business case initiatives, mainly concentrated on independent market platforms. A 
different group focuses on market design for flexibility from DER [19,20], and reviews the 
opportunities for DER across different electricity markets (ancillary services, system bal-
ancing and spot market) while others focus on the local market clearing methods used by 
distribution utilities [21] and stress the value of flexibility aggregation and optimal bid-
ding [8,22,23]. Some others relate to P2P energy trading and blockchain [24–29]. These 
studies highlight the role of P2P energy trading in the integration of local electricity mar-
kets (more transactions between consumers and prosumers), however there are regula-
tory barriers that need to be addressed to expand the benefits that P2P can bring to local 
electricity markets. In comparison with the current literature, this paper is mainly focused 
on the distribution utilities’ current practices (business as usual—BAU and trials) to con-
tract flexibility services from DER, considering different energy regulatory frameworks 
and market structures, and extending the scope of the analysis beyond Europe and to a 
larger number of use cases. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse and evaluate the deployment of smart platforms 
(operated by DSOs or by independent parties) in key jurisdictions that facilitate the trad-
ing of flexibility services—primarily by DSOs—in order to identify key lessons for inno-
vation projects. We draw on the findings from the Modelling the Economic Reactions Link-
ing Individual Networks (MERLIN) Project , which is being implemented by a distribu-
tion utility in Great Britain. This paper is based on the first two studies that the authors 
performed under the context of MERLIN, for further details see Anaya and Pollitt [30,31]. 
In its selection of key Use Cases this study seeks to discuss the different smart archi-
tecture solutions and main capabilities across different demonstrators and their relation-
ship to business as usual (BAU). It also analyses flexibility market designs, identifies main 
characteristics, and compares different price formation schemes and procurement meth-
ods. The value of flexibility for DSOs is also discussed. The paper concentrates only on 
those cases where DSOs are the ones that procure flexibility services for their own use 
primarily (i.e., constraint management, ancillary services). 
This paper looks for a diverse set of projects/initiatives from different jurisdictions 
including Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain (GB), Japan, The Netherlands and 
Norway. They have been chosen following a review of the different national publicly 
funded programmes and demonstration projects required by governments including 
those subject to regulatory sandbox, European Commission funded projects and academic 
and industry reports. A total of 13 use cases were selected. A questionnaire was designed 
and filled in per each use case in order to ensure coherence in the discussion and identifi-
cation of lessons learned. Interviews were also arranged in some cases. Further details 
about the methodology are provided in Section 3. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a background on smart 
solutions used in the procurement of flexibility services from DER and a short discussion 
of flexibility markets. Section 3 discusses our use case methodology where we identify 
and analyse 13 Use Case examples of flexibility procurement from seven leading jurisdic-
tions. We next go on to discuss the lessons from the use cases in different areas. Section 4 
discusses briefly the smart architecture and solutions that have been developed in the use 
cases for the procurement of flexibility services. Section 5 discusses different options for 
market designs across the use cases for contracting flexibility services, with a focus on 
their procurement methods and pricing rules, remuneration schemes, products (services) 
to be procured, flexibility providers and penalties. Section 6 explains the new business 
models adopted across the use cases for contracting flexibility services with a focus on the 
cooperation with aggregators and independent platforms. Section 7 discusses the value of 
flexibility and identifies a set of factors to be taken into account when defining the cost of 
counterfactuals. Section 8 identifies the most and least common trends across the use cases 
and suggests a new auction mechanism approach. Section 9 identifies key regulatory is-
sues that can help to unlock the value of flexibility. This section sets up the discussion that 
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we develop in our companion paper in this special issue [32] which examines stakeholder 
views on how regulation might need to change to better promote the procurement of flex-
ibility services in the seven jurisdictions we look at. Section 10 concludes by identifying 
the main lessons for innovation projects that support the use of flexibility services. 
2. Background on Smart Platforms and Flexibility Markets 
2.1. Smart Architecture Solutions for Planning and Energy Trading 
DSOs are deploying new capabilities in order to deal with the increase of DER and 
to take advantage of the services that these can provide to alleviate grid constraints. Those 
capabilities can be in different forms, such as new platforms for planning and energy trad-
ing, in order to manage and operate more efficiently the networks in line with the increas-
ing number of DER connected to the distribution grid. Active Network Management 
(ANM) and Distributed Energy Resources Management System (DERMS)) are among the 
BAU tools deployed by DSOs to manage and optimise DER. ANM is a core part of the 
smart grid concept and is used by utilities to manage network constraints, to monitor and 
respond to the state of the network in real time [33]. ANM has been an instrumental tool 
for several distribution utilities in GB to offer flexible (or interruptible) connections to 
DER, with around 4GW of total flexible capacity connected by 2020 with approximately 
13 GWh of curtailed energy [34]. A DERMS solution helps utilities to manage, aggregate 
and dispatch DER more efficiently and to take advantage of them for several purposes 
including grid management and network reinforcement deferral, optimising their output 
[35]. Different market segments can benefit from DERMS deployment, including utilities, 
aggregators and energy markets. 
The level of deployment of these smart solutions across utilities differs. In the evalu-
ation of the role of flexibility in supporting the grids and the role in demand in 18 juris-
dictions from Europe, Asia, Oceania, North and South America, only GB and New York 
are the ones that use ANM in BAU solutions [36]. In Europe for instance, few vendors can 
offer a full deployment of DERMS in the form of BAU and a common standard has not 
been reached yet [37]. Power flow analysis for planning has been used for a long time but 
if the utility manages DER the network has to be analysed in real time. Many of the 
DERMS solutions are developing new capabilities, but only in trial projects (i.e., Power 
Potential and MERLIN in GB). A comprehensive list of DERMS current and future capa-
bilities can be found in [38]. In New York, one of the pioneers in the transitioning to a 
modern utility with a set of new functionalities known as Distribution System Platform 
(DSP) functions, DERMS development across investor-owned-utilities (IOUs) is diverse 
and its being implemented by following a phased approach. 
DSP functions increase over time [29]. According to [39], Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric is among the most advanced in DERMS development (DERMS constitutes a key func-
tionality of the DSP). DERMS is not a standalone tool and along with the adaptation of 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based Advanced Distribution Man-
agement System (ADMS), provides an advanced solution that will enable the utility to 
leverage DER for grid and local reliability benefits, realize value from DER and to benefit 
from potential distribution investment deferral [40]. ADMS and DERMS are different sys-
tems, which complement each other when they are integrated. This integration enables 
complete distribution grid visualisation, aggregation, forecasting and control from differ-
ent perspectives [41]. The development of an ADMS-DERMS solution is still a work in 
progress with few products on the market [42]. 
2.2. Flexibility Markets 
Smart solutions (e.g., ANM, DERMS, blockchain, smart meters) along with the de-
ployment of cheaper DER have enabled the deployment of local flexibility markets. For 
instance, solar PV units in combination with advanced inverters allows DSOs to control 
their output (ramping up or down power) when it is required (such as in the Smart Grid 
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Hub in the Avacon Use Case, see Section 4 for details). Non-wired solutions are an alter-
native to more expensive network investments. Regulation is playing an important role. 
Among the interesting initiatives are the adoption of totex regulation in GB that looks at 
the total expenditure rather than separate operational expenditure (opex) and capital ex-
penditure (capex) allowances (which increases the freedom to select the optimal option). 
In Australia, the Regulatory Investment Test for Distribution (RIT-D) scheme aims to pro-
mote efficient investment in the distribution network and requires network projects val-
ued at more than $6 MM to look for non-network options (i.e., flexibility services from 
DER) [43]. The threshold (initially set at $5 MM) is revised every three years. The scheme 
is also applicable to transmission operators (RIT-T). Several countries have established 
regulatory frameworks for virtual power plant (VPP) trading and demand response 
schemes [44]. Some countries have specific funds for VPP demonstrators such as in Aus-
tralia for coordination between the system operator, energy regulator and others, and in 
Japan (vehicle to grid—V2G VPP) via the Minister for Economy, Transport and Infrastruc-
ture (METI)’s 2018 Sustainable open Innovation Initiative (SII). There are also initiatives 
such as the Universal Smart Energy Framework (USEF) that aims to standardise and trade 
flexibility by proposing an integrated framework for markets and products. USEF frame-
work has been adopted in different projects across The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, 
and most recently in GB (with project Fusion), [45]. 
Most of the current developments in local electricity markets are focused on P2P 
schemes and only few of them involve the participation of DSOs in the procurement of 
services from DER for congestion management and ancillary services. Congestion man-
agement is the most common application for flexibility services. There are three important 
developments in local congestion markets [46]. First, authorisation for all potential players 
to participate. Clearly in expanding participation to new players, it is important not to 
arbitrarily limit participation. Second, in order to include new players, conditions for par-
ticipation may need to be redefined. Third, new markets and services will need to be es-
tablished (which is the aim of Project MERLIN). 
We can distinguish different approaches that DSOs are using for procuring flexibility 
services. First, some of them are integrated within the same network operator, which 
means that the DSO may have an agreement with its customers to directly manage their 
generation assets or flexible loads. In this case, depending on the regulatory framework, 
DER can be curtailed if the DSO mandates this (this happens in Germany). 
Second, it can also be via an independent party or platform where aggregators (or 
VPP operators) or independent traders act as intermediators between the flexibility pro-
viders (FPs) and the utility. In this case a market-based approach is used instead in many 
cases (i.e., in GB for congestion management). However, the way in which these interme-
diaries compensate the FPs (i.e., DER owners) may vary (e.g., fixed rate per year, a fixed 
amount per activation etc.). Aggregators are increasing and expanding their participation 
in the procurement of flexibility services for both operators; TSOs and DSOs. Among those 
services are load shifting, balancing services and local flexibility [2]. 
A third category is when the procurement is via an independent platform (e.g., Piclo-
Flex and Cornwall Local Energy Market—CLEM in GB, GOPACS in the Netherlands, 
Nodes in Norway, Enera in Germany). Often this involves a pay-as-bid pricing rule with 
different remuneration mechanisms (e.g., availability, utilisation, activation or service fee 
payments). In this category, the DSO may also procure flexibility (i.e., congestion man-
agement) through existing day-ahead and/or intra-day markets. According to [17] a plat-
form for trading gives visibility, the opportunity to meet qualification criteria and allows 
competitive procurement. 
The use cases that are part of this paper are within the three categories described 
above. A fourth category is also noted but will not be discussed in detail. This relates to 
the flexibility services offered to the TSOs instead, by aggregators/suppliers (e.g., Van-
debron-Tennet project in The Netherlands) and by DSOs (e.g., the case of ENWL from GB 
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and United Energy from Australia in the provision of specific services to NGESO and 
AEMO respectively). 
3. Use Case Methodology 
3.1. Methodology 
For the selection of the use cases we have concentrated on those where flexibility 
services are procured by network operators (mainly DSOs) to solve congestion constraints 
(i.e., peak loads), voltage constraints etc.; and that make use of smart platforms for trading 
flexibility services. 
To identify use cases we performed a review of the different national publicly funded 
programmes and demonstration projects required by governments including those sub-
ject to regulatory sandbox (e.g., Network Innovation Competition programme in GB; 
Smart energy showcases—Digital agenda for the energy transition in Germany; Austral-
ian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) DER projects in Australia; innovation projects 
from METI in Japan etc.). The review also included key independent initiatives by DSOs 
and those funded by the European Commission. 
In order to be consistent in the discussion of use cases, a questionnaire was designed 
to capture and standardise key information for each one (see Appendix A). The question-
naire has been pre-filled and, in many cases, personal communication was required (i.e., 
via email, phone calls) in order to ask for clarifications. 
3.2. Use Case Selection 
We have deliberately selected use cases that cover diverse perspectives. First, we 
have covered 13 projects/initiatives implemented in different countries from Europe, Asia 
and Australasia. These operate under different regulatory frameworks and market rules. 
They include projects led not only by network operators (DSOs, TSOs) but also by inde-
pendent parties (i.e., independent platforms and research institutions). 
Second, this paper discusses the latest projects, primarily those recently implemented 
(from 2017 onwards). The energy sector is evolving rapidly, with new developments in 
the regulatory, technological and commercial arena. We have a combination of demon-
strators (those that are using real data for solving congestion issues etc.), demonstrators 
under proof of concept (such as the case of Japan with a new V2G VPP proposal that is 
expected to be implemented in 2021 in the balancing market) and those that are already 
part of BAU (especially independent platforms and distribution utilities in GB). In Japan, 
an increase in the number of VPP resources from electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hy-
brid electric vehicles (PHEVs) is expected. METI’s Energy Resource Aggregation Business 
Council states that by 2030 there will be around 9.7 m EVs/PHEVs in Japan which amounts 
to 44 GW (equivalent to 44 thermal power plants). 
Third, there is also diversity in the type of service/product to be procured and in the 
type of FPs (from residential customers to large generators). In terms of the services, even 
though most of them deal with congestion issues (i.e., due to peak loads). However some 
of them also involve the procurement of reactive power to solve voltage issues, either now 
(e.g., power potential and SPEN in GB) or in the future, such as in the case of Ausgrid 
(who are currently in second phase of their project). 
Fourth, different approaches to market auction design are observed, with a combina-
tion of competitive (i.e., pay-as-bid) and non-competitive mechanisms (i.e., regulated 
prices), remuneration schemes (advanced and/or utilisation payments) and procurement 
periods (from months ahead to day-ahead). Table 1 summarises the use cases. 
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Table 1. Summary of Projects/Initiatives. 
Country Project/Initiative Name Project Leader(S) Type Start Date Status 




Battery Virtual Power 
Plant (VPP) [47] 
Ausgrid (DSO) demonstrator June-18 
ongoing (Phase 1 
completed) 
via aggregators 



















Power Potential [51] NGESO (TSO) demonstrator 2017 end March 2021 directly, aggregators 
Flexible Power [52] WPD (DNO) BAU March-19 ongoing 
via independent plat-
forms  
Flexibility Hub [53] UKPN (DNO) BAU March-19 ongoing 
via independent plat-
form (Piclo Flex) 
Piclo Flex [54] Piclo  BAU March-19 ongoing 
via independent plat-
form (involves several 
DNOs) 
Cornwall Local Energy 
Market [55] 
Centrica trial May-19 
ongoing (Phases 1 




V2G Demonstrator Project 
Using EVs as Virtual 






June-18 ongoing  via aggregators 
The Nether-
lands 
Dynamo [57] Liander (DSO) BAU Q4 2017 ongoing  via aggregators  
GOPACS [58] 
TenneT (TSO) 
and 6 DSOs  
BAU  January-19 ongoing  
via national platform 
(involves TSO and 
DSOs) 






(*) Independent platforms allow the participation of aggregators via them. 
Based on the analysis of use cases we want to explore the way in which network 
operators are currently using flexibility services to deal with grid management issues and 
how this can be translated into better operation and planning of their networks. 
3.3. Evaluation of Use Cases 
We now go on to evaluate the use cases on a number of dimensions. We do this by 
considering what recent developments there are in the system architecture behind smart 
flexibility solutions; what market designs are being used to procure flexibility; how they 
are recognising the need to support new business models; how the value of flexibility is 
calculated by the DSO; what are the common and unusual trends in the development of 
flexibility procurement mechanisms and what is still missing; and finally, we discuss the 
role of the regulator in promoting flexibility markets. In each case we offer some general 
reflections on what this means for flexibility procurement by the DSO. Appendix B sum-
marises the main characteristics of each use case, including interesting features and issues. 
4. Smart Flexibility Solutions and New System Architecture 
Most of the use cases acknowledge the development of smart architectures and solu-
tions for the procurement of flexibility services in order to facilitate communication with, 
control of and access to different types of flexibility (flexible loads, generators, storage, 
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others), data processing, activation of bids, optimal selection of bids, etc. Some of these 
developments are integrated within the DSO, others within independent platforms and 
others are developed by aggregators. For instance, in the Nice Smart Valley Use Case, 
Enedis has developed the E-FLEX tool that allows communication with aggregators via 
the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) channels, to receive bids and to 
call bids from them and to activate the most appropriate ones (as suggested by Enedis). 
Their respective aggregators (EdF, Engie) have also developed new tools to connect with 
E-FLEX. In the Avacon use case, the smart grid hub (SGH) was developed to access and 
control generators of any type directly at low voltage level via digital switching. SGH is 
considered a single use of DERMS. Power Potential has implemented a DERMS solution 
and also a new Platform for Ancillary Services (PAS)—a control and monitoring solution, 
which is the main interface between the system operator (NGESO) and DERMS. The Alt-
dorfer Fleximart (ALF) platform proposes the development of the Smart Meter Gateway 
(SMGW) along with a control box for connecting, measuring and controlling different 
types of flexibilities. While in CLEM and Western Power Distribution (WPD) Phase 2 Use 
Cases a new optimal clearing solution with identification of constraints has been devel-
oped by N-SIDE. 
5. Market Designs for Flexibility Services 
5.1. Procurement Method and Pricing Rule 
With some exceptions (e.g. Avacon), most of the network operators in the use cases 
use a market-based approach (i.e. tenders) for the procurement of flexibility services, in-
cluding those procured via independent platforms and aggregators. Dynamo in The Neth-
erlands pays a regulated price to the aggregator for flexibility services; however, the se-
lection of the aggregator was via competition. In terms of pricing rules, we distinguish 
three types: pay-as-bid, regulated prices and pay-as-clear. The price formation of these 
three categories also varies across the use cases. Some of them use pay-as-bid or pay-as-
clear with free prices, while others use pay-as-bid with some indication of regulated prices 
(i.e., in the form of maximum prices or ranges with lower/upper values per site), and still 
others pay regulated prices only, usually with fixed amounts or ceilings depending on the 
type of service to be procured. For instance, the use of free prices via pay-as-bid usually 
applies when flexibility services are contracted via platforms that are integrated within 
existing markets (i.e., Nodes, GOPACS with Energy Trading Platform Amsterdam—
ETPA) or when services are contracted for balancing the system together with ancillary 
services (i.e., Power Potential in GB, V2G, VPP in Japan). Pay-as-clear with free prices is 
only used by WPD (Phase 2 project with CLEM). 
In GB, most distribution network operators (DNOs) involved with the procurement 
of flexibility services are within the second category (i.e., pay-as-bid, with some indication 
of regulated prices). In GB we use the term DNO rather than DSO. Many of them provide 
an indication of maximum prices or lower and upper values at each substation. This is the 
case for the DNO UKPN in their procurement of flexibility services at HV sites. In France, 
even though the demonstrator project proposes a competitive mechanism using pay-as-
bid to remunerate aggregators, the size of compensation appears to be limited to the value 
of flexibility that Enedis has estimated, up to 24 €/kW/year [60]. Results from this experi-
ment suggest that the value is relatively low, which may discourage participation. 
Regulated prices (e.g., fixed amounts such as yearly lump-sum payments, vouchers, 
fixed prices per activation, prices in line with the loss of production, or in the form of a 
discount on grid charges regardless of utilisation) are mainly paid to small-scale DER such 
as residential customers (with flexible loads and small generating/storage units). An ex-
ception to this rule is Dynamo, where a regulated price is paid by the DSO to the aggre-
gator, due to the limited number of aggregators that can provide flexibility services to the 
medium voltage (MV) substation when it is required. These payments are in many cases 
Energies 2021, 14, 4475 9 of 25 
 
 
made by aggregators (which are compensated by network operators for flexibility ser-
vices), with some exceptions (such as the case of Avacon where the DSO is the one that 
compensates the residential customers). The size of this remuneration is sometimes 
agreed via a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) (e.g., Dynamo). This means that figures are 
not in the public domain or are only provided in the form of a range of values (e.g., in 
Australia). The applicability of regulated prices to small-scale customers shows that in 
contrast to medium or large-scale customers (i.e., industrial, commercial, generators), res-
idential customers are offered longer term contracts and then are exposed to lower levels 
of uncertainty. This may also imply lower levels of remuneration in comparison with the 
industrial/commercial customers—see for example the ALF use case in Germany. 
5.2. Remuneration Scheme 
Depending on the type of service, network operators compensate flexibility provid-
ers using different types of payments: utilisation (or dispatch, or in the form of spread 
payment), reserve (e.g., availability, arming) or other types (e.g., activations, service fee, 
etc.). We observe that the type of payment set in many of the use cases is in line with the 
way similar services are already being compensated in related national markets for con-
straint management, reserves, reactive power (e.g., flexibility services procured by DNOs 
in GB, Dynamo, V2G VPP in Japan, Power Potential, ALF for short-term products and the 
services procured via GOPACS and Nodes). There would therefore appear to be some 
standardisation (at least within the same jurisdiction) in the remuneration schemes for 
flexibility services. However, there is less agreement in terms of the value that network 
operators provide to each payment component, especially for schemes where prices are 
not set “free” but have regulated elements. For instance, while WPD allocates a percentage 
value to each component (i.e., utilisation, availability) regardless of the site with an aver-
age value of £300/MWh (excluding their Restore service), UKPN indicates lower and up-
per values related to the total payment to be made at each high voltage (HV) site. Other 
use cases such as Nice Smart Valley in France are exposed to a lower value of flexibility 
due to the fixed amount estimated by Enedis, while in Dynamo, Liander values utilisation 
and availability similarly. Section 7 discusses further how network operators value flexi-
bility. 
5.3. Products/Services 
Most of the services identified in the use cases are for managing network constraints 
(via increase/reduction in demand, generation, storage) and in a few cases for balancing 
the system by contracting ancillary services (i.e., reactive power, voltage management). In 
contrast with conventional energy services in the wholesale market, these services are 
usually required in specific local areas, mainly to solve local grid issues (the closer an asset 
is to the place where the flexibility is required, the higher its effectiveness to solve it). Thus 
the location of the asset matters. Most of them are procured by DSOs (DNOs in GB), some 
of them can be procured by both distribution and transmission network operators simul-
taneously (Nodes, GOPACS, CLEM with WPD Phase 2 project), and only one by the sys-
tem operator in GB (Power Potential). The name of the services varies across use cases 
with some level of standardisation noticed in those under BAU operation such as in Japan 
(RR-FIT) and in GB (flexibility services offered by DNOs). DNOs in GB have recently 
standardised the naming of flexibility services based on Energy Networks Association 
(ENA) recommendations. There are four proposed branding names: sustain, secure, dy-
namic and restore, see [61]. Depending on the type of service, we observe two kinds of 
trading period: short term (i.e., day-ahead, intra-day) or medium/long term (e.g., 
weeks/months/years ahead). Most of our distribution utilities are offering a short-term 
trading period (except for flexibility services procured by UKPN and WPD but including 
the case of CLEM with WPD phase 2). 
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For some use cases, the trading period is in line with the current rules for the pro-
curement of similar services in other markets (i.e., V2G VPP in Japan, Dynamo, Nice Smart 
Valley, ALF). 
5.4. Flexibility Providers 
We identify a large range of flexibility providers using diverse technologies including 
flexible loads (e.g., heat pumps, hybrid systems, cooling systems), generation and storage 
units (including EV batteries) and conventional cogeneration/combined heat and power 
(CHP). Depending on the future CHP regulatory framework, innovative developments in 
cogeneration, such as Micro-Collective-Flexible-SmartHigh-Efficiency MCFlexSHE CHP 
and cogeneration cooperatives/communities, could become important flexibility re-
sources. For a discussion about the possible future regulatory framework of CHP in Eu-
rope, addressing these and other developments, see [62]. 
Flexibility providers can benefit from revenue stacking only if it does not compro-
mise the contracted capacity (i.e., avoidance of double activation) and in some cases their 
participation is subject to a minimum capacity on an aggregated or individual basis (i.e., 
Power Potential, UKPN and other DNOs in GB). In contrast with the typical flexibility 
providers represented by larger customers (e.g., business, commercial) and medium-large 
sized generators/storage systems (which usually participate in the provision of balancing 
services procured by system operators), the participation of residential customers in the 
provision of flexibility is permitted in many of the use cases. The participation of residen-
tial customers in flexibility markets is expected to grow in importance. However due to 
the limited size of their flexibility, a third party (i.e., aggregator or supplier) is required to 
facilitate residential trading, making the whole flexibility package more attractive for net-
work operators. In addition, smart meters can also help to understand and better forecast 
the flexibility performance of residential customers, which can be translated into a more 
cost-reflective compensation scheme. This opens an interesting debate about the manage-
ment of and access to customers’ data. Are independent aggregators or DSOs allowed to 
get this data? Is the access restricted to retailers? Rules vary across jurisdictions with some 
of them already offering “one stop shop” for data (e.g., in Norway with Elhub which be-
gan operation in November 2019). 
5.5. Penalites 
Penalties seem superficially attractive, but in practice they appear to be expensive to 
impose because of flexibility providers’ risk aversion. Non-payment for utilisation can be 
a large penalty in itself. However, there is an issue over availability payments needing 
some punishment to encourage actual availability. from the use cases, we observe how 
penalties are currently applied. Penalties for non-delivery are in the form of loss of reve-
nues (sometimes with specific rules per type of payment and service). Some of them are 
supported by DSO and Feed-in Tariff (FIT) regulation such as Avacon in Germany, with 
loss of the network charge discount (Section 14a Energy Industry Act - EnWG - ) for flex-
ible loads and loss of compensation (FIT) for DER. Others have specific methodologies 
that reflect BAU operation rules (e.g., WPD and UKPN from GB in the procurement of 
flexibility services via demand response, V2G VPP Japan in line with balancing services, 
in GOPACS based on ETPA terms and conditions, etc.). For instance, WPD proposes a 
more sophisticated methodology in comparison with UKPN. Both define a threshold (of 
delivery performance: DP) where flexibility providers can be compensated fully if DP ≥ 
90% or 95% respectively, however for lower values UKPN applies a linear relationship 
between the ratio of payment and DP, if DP < 60% no payment is made [63]. On the other 
hand, WPD applies a non-linear approach. According to WPD and based on its previous 
experience a linear relationship between utilisation payments and delivery does not in-
centivise the accurate declaration of capacity by flexibility providers [64]. There are also a 
group of use cases where penalty schemes have not been defined yet or are not imposed. 
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6. The Need for New Business Models 
Network operators are using different ways to procure flexibility services. Some of 
them are testing more than one channel, such as WPD (via its own platform, Piclo Flex 
and CLEM), Liander (with Dynamo and via GOPACS too), Ausgrid with Battery VPP and 
additional demand response programmes (part of the Power2U Program). Except for 
Avacon, the participation of aggregators (which can be compulsory or optional) is permit-
ted across all the use cases. According to [2], aggregators can provide: local flexibility (to 
DSOs subject to the existence of a local market), load shifting (in the form of demand side 
response to grid operators) and balancing services (such as ancillary services). Some net-
work operators allow the procurement of flexibility services via a single aggregator (i.e., 
Battery VPP in Australia, Dynamo). Sometimes the decision to have one aggregator is due 
to a lack of participation in congested areas at specific sites (i.e., HV/MV substations). This 
is the case of Dynamo for instance. For this reason, the remuneration scheme agreed be-
tween the network operator and the aggregator is via regulated prices. Others require the 
participation of at least two aggregators to incentivise competition (i.e., Nice Smart Val-
ley). The advantage of contracting with aggregators is that it mitigates the risks of non-
delivery (aggregators compile and manage bulky capacity from a portfolio of smaller flex-
ibility providers). Aggregators also facilitate the participation of residential customers in 
the provision of flexibility services to network operators (by aggregating small-scale flex-
ible loads, generation and storage). However, the rules regarding the role of “independent 
aggregators” (which do not act as electricity suppliers) are not clear across the jurisdic-
tions. For instance, France and Belgium are among the few European countries with spe-
cific rules for independent aggregators [65]. Independent aggregators may be discouraged 
from participating in specific markets (e.g., wholesale, ancillary services). For further dis-
cussion about independent aggregators and their participation in flexibility markets (i.e., 
demand response) see [66]. 
Independent platforms are also evolving and bringing new options for procuring 
flexibility services. Procuring flexibility services via independent platforms, especially 
those integrated within existing markets (e.g., GOPACS, Nodes), increases the chance of 
matching supply and demand. These platforms allow the participation of DSOs and the 
TSO and are examples of coordination platforms (i.e., DSO-TSO), preventing any conflicts 
as a result of congestion-related action by the DSOs or TSO. ALF is the other independent 
platform operated by Forschungsstelle für Energiewirtschaft e. V. (FfE), that in common 
with GOPACS and Nodes allows the matching of supply and demand orders; however, 
it is still under proof of concept. According to FfE, and at the time of writing, it was not 
clear whether ALF will continue as an independent platform or will be integrated into the 
DSO. 
7. The Value of Flexibility 
The value of flexibility depends on where, when and for what it is needed. From the 
use cases, only a few of them provide some indication about how the value of flexibility 
has been estimated (i.e., in the form of maximum/minimum payments). The decision to 
provide an indication of the value of flexibility depends also on the maturity of the flexi-
bility market and whether this is integrated into an existing energy market (e.g., intra-day, 
day-ahead wholesale). It also may depend on the type of auction mechanism that is used. 
For instance, reverse auctions require a starting reference price provided by the buyer (i.e., 
it could be the costs of the conventional solution to solve the problem: network reinforce-
ment, diesel generation costs etc.). The procurement of flexibility services by DNOs in GB 
is relatively new (starting in 2019 as BAU). This means that potential flexibility providers 
may still need an indication of the size of their payments. However, in the case of GO-
PACS, Nodes and also V2G VPP in Japan (all these are integrated or are due to be inte-
grated into existing markets), a pay-as-bid approach is used with free prices and without 
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any indication of potential gains. This makes sense because the number of flexibility pro-
viders is potentially larger, increasing participation and liquidity. 
From the use cases we observe WPD uses a maximum value irrespective of the site 
(set at £300/MWh), UKPN provides a range of minimum and maximum values associated 
with each HV site as a result of cost benefit analysis and Enedis proposes a maximum 
value irrespective of the site. For Avacon however, the value is established via regulation 
(i.e., network grid discounts offered by the DSO). None of these projects provide details 
of the methodology used. A brief explanation is provided by Enedis, [60]. However, this 
is a general value that is not associated with the problem to be solved in Nice Smart Valley 
use case. In the case of WPD the value is just an indication from a previous project. WPD 
has suggested that it may use of a pay-as-clear approach (with free prices) when there is 
enough competition. However, results from the experiment (CLEM with WPD Phase 2), 
suggest that flexibility providers have continued bidding at prices close to the original 
value. 
The value of flexibility can be estimated based on the cost of counterfactual solutions 
to solve the problem. For instance, if there is a need to reinforce the network, the value of 
flexibility is related to the cost of deferred capital. This can be estimated as an annual value 
in order to set the maximum amount the distribution utility could spend in flexibility per 
year at a specific point of the network. Flexibility can be an alternative to network rein-
forcement, however, in practice different potential options need to be evaluated by distri-
bution utilities. These include reconfiguration of the existing network with appropriate 
switching in and out of equipment and the use of utility only assets (i.e., a voltage tap 
changer), or the use of assets that can be run hotter for longer with better maintenance etc. 
The value of flexible services should also consider regulatory incentives and total 
costs (totex). In GB, the RIIO-ED1 totex allowance provides financial incentives to DNOs 
to optimally trade off capital and operating costs in order to minimise total costs. Financial 
incentives (or penalties) also apply to (1) quality of service measures such as customer 
minute lost—CML and customer interruptions—CI; (2) connections (time to connect in-
centive); (3) customer services (related to social obligations output); and (4) losses (a dis-
cretionary reward scheme). The largest incentives come from the interruptions incentive 
scheme—IIS (composed of CML and CI). For instance, for the period 2017–2018 IIS incen-
tives represented around 70% of the total incentives [67]. 
The case for the inclusion of option value is less clear. This requires a probabilistic 
view of the future. It is quite difficult to provide a comprehensive and passably accurate 
set of all the relevant future scenarios in which the participation of an asset or DER solu-
tion might appear. As [68] makes clear in Chapter 5 (on Real Option Valuation), the prob-
lem with real options is that they are a qualitative and somewhat subjective way of de-
parting from normal investment appraisal. They are particularly popular and useful in 
natural resource sectors, or sectors with exclusive rights (e.g., investment in a patent pro-
tected technology). They should be treated with caution under the following circum-
stances: first, when the initial investment is not a pre-requisite to subsequent investments; 
second, when the firm does not have the exclusive right to make subsequent investments; 
and third, when, the advantage the option investment gives does not lead to sustained 
advantage. These criticisms apply in a world of uncertainty about the future path of tech-
nology for flexibility within the electricity sector. Another problem, as [67] notes, with 
non-tradeable options is that they will inevitably not be fully reflected in the valuation of 
a private firm. For a regulated firm this translates to the risk that the regulator might not 
fully recognise the cost of a real option in its regulatory asset base. 
If option value is to be recognised at all in a regulatory setting, there has to be a cap 
on willingness to pay for option value. There is in every other sphere of economic activity. 
This is because if there is not a cap one can end up justifying large amounts to be spent on 
contingencies most of which will never be realised and which will therefore be difficult to 
justify ex post. For a good discussion of the role of option value in investments more gen-
erally, see [69] and for option value in transmission planning [70]. 
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Some jurisdictions such as New York have suggested a common methodology for 
valuing flexibility with a focus on those provided by DER. Each of the six distribution 
utilities in New York State (known as Investor-owned utilities—IOUs) has produced its 
own document on how to do cost benefit analysis of DER, see for instance [71]. These 
documents point out the dangers of double counting and the need to carefully work out 
whether a category of benefit is additional to others already included. The methodology 
identifies four pots of benefits (e.g., bulk system, distribution system, reliability/resiliency 
and external) and costs (including incentives to participate). An interesting approach is 
the credit given to community generation (at 2.25 c/kWh) [72]. This raises the issue of an 
additional value to be put on community DER, not captured elsewhere. 
After selecting and estimating the respective values for each factor, the next step is to 
estimate the total costs of the counterfactual which reflects the willingness to pay for flex-
ibility. Depending on the type of service and estimations of its use, the total value can then 
be expressed in single components (i.e., maximum annual availability and utilisation 
prices). 
8. Most and Least Common Trends and What Is Still Missing 
8.1. Most Common Trends 
Many of the use cases involve the procurement of a set of flexibility services (i.e., 
multiple products provided by a diverse range of technologies) which aim to solve differ-
ent types of grid constraints, with a focus on congestion at the distribution level. Among 
the most common technologies are solar PV, storage systems (including domestic batter-
ies), wind turbines, flexible loads (such as heat pumps) and CHP. There is also a combi-
nation of different remuneration schemes, with utilisation and availability payments, with 
pay-as-bid (including those with regulated components) being the most common ap-
proach. The participation of third parties such as aggregators is also allowed in most of 
the use cases. In some cases, their participation can be compulsory (e.g., Battery VPP, V2G 
VPP Japan, Nice Smart Valley, Dynamo), in others it can be optional (e.g., ALF, WPD with 
Flexible Power, UKPN, Power Potential). Independent platforms are also evolving, and 
many DSOs are using them (or planning to) as an alternative way to procure flexibility 
services. 
8.2. Least Common Trends 
Only a few of the use cases specify the procurement of ancillary services, especially 
in the form of reactive power/voltage management. In terms of flexibility services, Nice 
Smart Valley is the only one where flexibility is also provided by customers with hybrid 
systems (i.e., by switching from gas and electricity to only gas in case of network con-
straints). A hybrid system produces both heating and domestic hot water using gas or 
electricity. The selection of the most efficient generator is managed by an intelligent con-
trol system. This is the first time in France that a remote control was built in order to man-
age gas appliances [73]. The matching of supply and demand orders are only observed in 
platforms that are integrated within existing markets, with the exception of ALF which 
also offers this matching (still in “proof of concept”). GOPACS is the only one where the 
“intraday congestion spread (IDCONS)” is paid instead by the network operator (TSO or 
DSO) that requires the flexibility service (estimated by the price difference between the 
seller and buy orders). According to Stedin (a DSO), the probability of having no matching 
orders is very low, due to the interaction of GOPACS with the existing market which has 
sufficient liquidity. However, if matching does not happen the market model changes to 
the mandatory regime, where bidding is required. 
In comparison with other distribution utilities, several DNOs from GB are already 
procuring flexibility services via Piclo Flex as BAU. GOPACS has been adopted by a few 
DSOs and by a TSO (TenneT) as BAU. In terms of the pricing rule, CLEM with WPD 
(Phase 2) is the only use case with a pay-as-clear proposal. WPD performs a N-2 test to 
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determine whether to proceed with the pay-as-clear approach. The test provides infor-
mation about the zones with enough participation to allow market clearing, otherwise the 
maximum price approach (i.e., £300/MWh) applies instead [74]. This approach is in line 
with the new pricing strategy proposed by WPD composed of three phases: Phase 1 fixed 
(current situation with a maximum value of £300/MWh), Phase 2 Pay-as-clear (when there 
is enough competition) and Phase 3 Full Market (a progression toward close to real-time 
market operation), [75]. 
8.3. What Is Still Missing 
In general, most of the use cases propose standard procurement methods to contract 
for flexibility services. To some extent many of the services procured are already being 
contracted by system operators (TSOs); the difference here is the application of these ser-
vices (i.e., for distribution grid management). Given that flexibility services are contracted 
by the DSOs (with operations subject to regulatory oversight), what is missing is a clear 
and standard methodology (at the country-level) that supports the selection of the most 
cost-efficient approach (i.e., baseline versus flexibility options). This is an important step 
that will help to define the maximum and minimum values that DSOs are willing to accept 
at each site (i.e., each substation). Other auction mechanisms need to be tested in the light 
of the increase of DER. There should also be a move towards uniform (pay-as-clear) pric-
ing rather than discriminatory (pay-as-bid) settlement rules. For a clear discussion of the 
need for both capacity-based bid selection and uniform pricing see [76]. This is because 
pay-as-bid rules encourage inefficient bidding and are out of line with wholesale energy 
market pricing. 
In the context of a new flexibility procurement auction, such as MERLIN, a reverse 
auction for DER response might make sense, rather than a fixed price. A reverse auction 
is a common method to auction diamonds, radio spectrum, electricity, gas, and other 
products [77]. The starting price cap could be the cost of the conventional solution (i.e., 
baseline costs). This reverse auction could specify a minimum benefit for customers to be 
achieved in the auction before it would be completed. This minimum benefit would cover 
the costs of the auction, plus some target revenue benefit for the customers. This benefit 
would arise as a combination of the price and quantity of flexibility; hence the auction 
would trade off lower prices and lower quantities of flexibility. The reverse auction should 
be a descending clock with an activity rule and deferred acceptance to make sure that all 
bidders participate fully and bid truthfully. An activity rule ensures that each bidder re-
mains active and only reveals its hand at the end of the auction (which is what happens 
in an eBay auction). It means that bidders need to participate in each round of the auction, 
indicating their willingness to accept the current price, in order to stay in the auction. 
Deferred acceptance means that if bidders reject an offer price this is irreversible (i.e., bid-
ders cannot re-enter at a lower price in the reverse auction) and no bid is firmly accepted 
until the final reconciliation. Bids could be made competitive across multiple constrained 
locations with some sort of bid scoring mechanism to handle the value of different loca-
tions. There may be rough and ready ways to clear a multi-locational auction, which pro-
vide a reasonable degree of efficiency, in line with [78]. Deferred acceptance allows the 
DNO to check whether there are any network reconfigurations, in the light of all bid quan-
tities and prices, which add consumer value, and this could be specifically made part of 
the auction. There would be room for experimentation as to the bid increments, the num-
ber of constraints to be included and the target revenue benefit from the auction to be set 
etc. 
We suggest there is value in experimenting with a reverse clock auction and a reve-
nue benefit target. This would involve starting the bidding at the willingness to pay for 
flexibility and reducing the price to increase the benefit to customers. The auction would 
be concluded when the target benefit had been achieved. The payment rule would be pay 
as clear—i.e., at the closing price all remaining offers in the market would be accepted and 
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paid the closing price. The existence of a large number of potential flexibility providers 
reinforces our preference for pay-as-clear rather than pay-as-bid. 
9. The Role of Regulation 
From the use cases, we observe different ways in which regulation can help to inte-
grate flexibility solutions (and all the advantages that this can provide) within BAU net-
work operation. These can be through funding innovation projects, adapting the price 
control schemes to promote more flexible networks and cost reflective tariffs, enabling 
and democratising digitalisation, and setting clear roles among the different parties 
(DSOs, aggregators etc). 
Regulation encourages network operators to experiment (via innovation funds or 
regulatory sandboxes) in order to gain knowledge that supports future regulation. Many 
of the use cases analysed in this paper have been partially funded by governments under 
specific competitive schemes such as Network Innovation Competition in GB, Schaufen-
ster intelligente Energie (Sinteg) in Germany, METI in Japan, Australian Energy Regulator 
(AER), some of which focus on VPP and demand response programmes. The aim of the 
demonstrator projects is not limited to testing the role of distribution utilities as neutral 
market facilitators for DER, encouraging new market participants and testing new busi-
ness models for trading flexibility services. It also aims to identify current limitations and 
future developments in the regulatory arena that promote flexibility. 
Regulation can help to provide the right incentives for network operators to opt for 
flexibility and hence more efficient operation, however finding a balanced approach—not 
over scaling the regulatory approach—is always a challenge. One way is via Totex regu-
lation. Totex regulation is adopted in GB, Germany, The Netherlands and Norway [79]. 
Due to its sophistication, the pace of its development (in time and specification) differs 
across countries. GB implemented the first Totex regulation in DPCR5 (period 2010–2015). 
Totex regulation goes beyond the energy sector with applications in the water sector (e.g., 
Ofwat in GB). A different approach is found in Australia, where the Regulatory Invest-
ment Test for Distribution (RIT-D) scheme promotes efficient investment in the distribu-
tion network by requiring higher value network projects to look for non-network options 
(i.e., flexibility services from DER) [43]. 
Setting more cost-reflective tariffs is something that can also help, for instance 
through the introduction of dynamic pricing facilitated via smart meters subject to mini-
mum requirements [80]. Looking forward, some studies acknowledge the benefits of dis-
tribution local marginal pricing (DLMP) to manage congestion using DER [81]. Even 
through nodal prices for transmission pricing (estimated as a result of an economic opti-
misation) have been applied by many system operators (e.g., USA, Australia, New Zea-
land, Singapore), their implementation at the distribution level is arguable and will de-
pend on the level of granularity required. Full DLMP based on economic optimisation at 
distribution level is still impractical due to lack of reliable optimisation methods [82]. 
Regulation also encourages digitalisation, especially in the adoption of smart meters 
and associated data management. The efficient management and integration of small-
scale flexibilities needs to be supported by smart meters, especially in the residential sec-
tor. This is important, considering that in most of the use cases the participation of the 
residential sector is supported. All the jurisdictions of the use cases evaluated in this paper 
are committed to supporting smart meter implementation (partially or nationwide). How-
ever, implementation varies. Norway completed their nationwide smart meter rollout in 
early 2019, followed by The Netherlands in 2020, while Germany will require until 2032. 
In Germany the rollout is mandatory only for customers with a consumption over 6 MWh 
(however those with lower consumption can voluntarily opt for it). 
Regulation can also help set the rules for accessing and managing behind the meter 
flexibility assets. Flexibility assets behind the meter need to be visible and tradable. In the 
case of Germany, we observed that there are limitations on the participation of domestic 
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battery systems. The current rules encourage behind-the-meter applications only, ignor-
ing the potential to provide flexibility services in-front-of the meter. 
Regulation can help to define the role of independent aggregators (also known as 
VPP operators) in the flexibility value chain. Aggregators are instrumental for explicit de-
mand-side flexibility (which involves a financial reward from network operators to flexi-
bility providers). Regulation regarding the role of independent aggregators varies across 
jurisdictions, especially in relation to their participation in retail, wholesale and ancillary 
markets. For instance, in the European market the participation of independent aggrega-
tors is mainly associated with industrial and commercial customers [83]. France is among 
the first movers—since 2003—in opening its different markets to the participation of in-
dependent aggregators (focusing on demand side response—see [84]). In GB, their partic-
ipation in the provision of balancing services to NGESO in the form of a “Virtual Lead 
Party” has been approved [85]. 
Regulators, along with industry stakeholders, will help to shape the future of the 
DSO by defining clear functions and new roles for distribution utilities (e.g., as a neutral 
market facilitator), including the extent of their interactions with other parties (e.g., TSOs, 
aggregators). Most of the use cases that are part of this study are testing new DSO capa-
bilities to manage the grid using flexibility services provided by third parties. No jurisdic-
tions have yet decided on a framework that reaffirms distribution utilities as neutral mar-
ket facilitators for DER or the creation of an independent party to manage this. The inter-
action between DSO-TSO is being evaluated in some jurisdictions of the use cases such as 
Australia, GB and The Netherlands. 
10. Concluding Remarks 
This paper explores the development of innovation projects and independent market 
platforms where the use of flexibility services from third parties is proposed to solve grid 
issues, especially at distribution. Thirteen use cases from seven jurisdictions were evalu-
ated covering different dimensions including the smart architectures, market design, new 
business models, value of flexibility, identification of most and least common trends. The 
role of regulation in the integration of more flexibility solutions was also discussed briefly. 
Key lessons from innovation projects can be identified per each dimension. These are sum-
marised in the next paragraphs. 
First, the key thing for a successful smart architecture is that it is easy for participants 
to understand and access. Making it as easy as possible to participate in a local flexibility 
market is key. A proof-of- concept exercise is recommended to test the capabilities of both 
the platforms themselves and their interoperability with existing systems. Simulation of 
flexibility markets is necessary to test optimisation algorithms, market rules etc. We 
would also recommend extensive stakeholder engagement to encourage market partici-
pation and feedback on the design of the smart interface. 
Second, clear rules regarding the market design to be adopted with specifications 
according to the type of service to be procured are required. For more established services 
we would recommend similar rules to the current ones applied by the GB DNOs (with 
respect to names, type of compensation, and penalty schemes) in order to ensure con-
sistency, standardisation and stakeholder buy-in. In terms of penalties, non-payment for 
non-delivery is a significant penalty. It is a good idea to have some penalty in the case of 
non-delivery during a specific event where flexibility was requested but not delivered by 
a contracted party. This penalty would vary from non-payment of utilisation payments if 
the contract was 100% on utilisation payment only, to some fraction of the availability 
payment if the payment were 100% on availability only. For the UK capacity market non-
delivery penalties for an individual unit are capped at 200% of monthly capacity pay-
ments [86]. 
Third, new business models that work depend on there being underlying sources of 
value to society that can be monetised. It is the role of the DSO in innovation projects to 
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identify what those sources of value are and to market test them. It may be that new busi-
ness models can be facilitated by actively encouraging DER and aggregator participation 
and, potentially, by signing exclusive contracts with a single aggregator, to whom encour-
aging participation is then delegated. 
Fourth, DSOs seeking to procure flexibility need to publish the principles on which 
they will evaluate the value of flexibility at a given network node and hence their willing-
ness to pay for flexibility (in line with the different services to be procured). This would 
involve building on the benefit-cost of DER methodologies outlined by the New York util-
ities (IOUs), suitably adapted for the local context. For example, in the UK this would 
involve making use of values in line with HM Treasury guidance on social cost benefit 
analysis. This recommendation is in line with the recent proposal of the ENA Open Net-
works Project (Workstream 1A—Flexibility Services) regarding the need to account for a 
common methodology across DNOs for Active Network Management (ANM) vs. Flexi-
bility vs. Reinforcement vs. other options [87]. 
Fifth, in the identification of the least common trends in the procurement of flexibility 
services, one area where more experimentation is needed is auction design. We suggest 
there is value in experimenting with a reverse clock auction and a revenue benefit target. 
This would involve starting the bidding at the willingness to pay for flexibility and reduc-
ing the price to increase the benefit to customers. The auction would be concluded when 
the target benefit had been achieved. The payment rule would be pay as clear—i.e., at the 
closing price all remaining offers in the market would be accepted and paid the closing 
price. The larger the number of potential flexibility providers the more the preference for 
pay-as-clear (rather than pay-as-bid). 
Finally, having a supportive regulatory environment around flexibility is crucial. An 
important task of innovation projects is to identify the limitations of the current regulatory 
regime in supporting socially desirable innovation. Unlocking the value of flexibility de-
pends on allowing the benefits to society to be monetised via the regulatory regime. We 
discuss the role of regulation more fully in our other paper in this special issue [32]. 
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DER Distributed Energy Resources 
DERMS Distributed Energy Resources Management System 
DNO Distribution Network Operator 
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MERLIN Modelling the Economic Reactions Linking Individual Networks 
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SPEN Scottish Power Energy Networks 
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TSO Transmission System Operator 
UKPN UK Power Networks 
USEF Universal Smart Energy Framework 
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Schaufenster intelligente Energie—Digitale Agenda für die Energiewende (Smart en-
ergy showcases—Digital agenda for the energy transition) 
V2G Vehicle to Grid 
VPP Virtual Power Plant 
WPD Western Power Distribution 
Appendix A. Use Case Template 




Project/initiative lead (any DSO, TSO, others?) 
Project/initiative partners 
Type of project/initiative (trial, business as usual) 
Start date 
End date (leave blank if this is BAU) 
Government/local authority/EU funded (Yes/No) 
Name of the programme/scheme (e.g., SINTEG in Germany, NIC in 
UK) 
Problem(s) to solve (e.g., congestion management, voltage or thermal 
constraints, other) 




Name/type of product 
Problem to be solved 
Price rule (e.g., pay as bid, pay as clear, other) 
Remuneration scheme (e.g., availability, utilisation, both, number of 
activations, other) 
Price formation for availability (e.g., regulated, free, other) 
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Price formation for utilisation (e.g., regulated, free, other, na) 
Maximum price for availability (€/kW) 
Maximum price for utilisation (€/MWh) 
Minimum bid (MW) 
Maximum bid (MW) 
Length of contract  
Procurement period (the time when the service is provided) 
Trading period (e.g., day-ahead until 4 pm, or between 10 am-12 pm) 
Number of tenders per year or periodicity (monthly, quarterly, any-
time, other) 
Define the party that trades (e.g., direct trading, via aggregators, both) 
Others 
DER connection point (LV, other) 
Are residential customers involved in the provision of flexibility ser-
vices? (yes, no) 
Use of DERMS for the project (yes, no, na) 
DSO-DSO coordination (yes, no) 
DSO-TSO coordination (yes, no) 
Grid management need (DSO, TSO, both) 
Penalties for non-delivery (yes, no). Specify trigger for non-delivery 
(e.g., if availability is less than 60% then zero payment) 
Appendix B. Use Case Comparison Table 
Part 1 
Country Use Case Product/Service to Be Traded/Tested Flexibility Providers 
Quantity Traded 






and voltage constraints 
(phase 2) 
residential battery systems up to 1 MW (VPP) 
France Nice Smart Valley 
distribution grid constraint 
(congestion) 
hybrid systems (residential hybrid boilers, CHP 
commercial building, hybrid rooftop), flexible cus-




distribution grid constraint 
(congestion) 
residential flexible loads (heat pumps, storage 





(with short- and long-term 
products) 
PV systems, heat pumps, electric vehicles, and 






reactive and active power 
PV systems, wind turbines, CHP, biogas plants, 
etc. 
approx. 11,700 
MVarh (wave 2)  
Flexible Power 
(WPD) 
flexibility services (several) 
PV systems, wind turbines, CHP, biogas plants, 
storage systems, flexible loads 
880 MW con-




flexibility services (several) 
PV systems, wind turbines, CHP, biogas plants, 
storage systems, flexible loads 
105 MW con-
tracted for 2020  
Piclo Flex flexibility services (several) 
PV systems, wind turbines, CHP, biogas plants, 
storage systems, flexible loads 
depends on the ca-
pacity to be pro-
cured by DNOs 
Cornwall Local 
Energy Market 
flexibility services (several) 
diesel generators, gas turbine, flow battery, domes-
tic battery clusters, ice manufacturer 
11 MVA (phase 1) 
Japan 
V2G Demonstra-
tor Project Using 
EVs as VPP Re-
source 
Replacement Reserve—for 
FIT (“RR-FIT”) due to net-
work congestion, voltage 
constraints  
EV batteries (V2G-VPP) not applicable 








Lidl (with cold store and battery at the distribution 






PV systems, wind turbines, CHP, biogas plants, 






ment, balancing services 
PV systems, wind turbines, CHP, biogas plants, 
storage systems, etc 
not available 
Part 2 
Country Use Case Price Rule 












only dispatch (10 kW 
battery with 10–15 
dispatch events can 
get paid between 









not directly but subject 
to the value of flexibility 
set by Enedis 
(1) availability/oth-
ers: for aggregators 
depending on the 
Use Case; for cus-
tomers: fixed/varia-
ble amounts to par-
ticipate in the trial; 










ers: Flex loads (a dis-
count of around 57% 
of grid charge), (2) 
utilisation: DER 
compensated in line 






short term: pay-as-bid, 
long term: regulated 
prices (customers) 
not defined yet 
(1) short term: utili-
sation according to 
contracted power 
and offered price, (2) 
long term: lump-
sum payment (i.e., 
yearly) 
optional (short 





pay-as-bid (wave 2) no 
utilisation (active 





















HV: pay-as-bid, LV: reg-
ulated price 
yes (range per site) 
availability (secure), 
utilisation (secure, 
dynamic), service fee 
(sustain: 
optional 




Range (with lower 
and upper values) 
regarding total price 
for HV (secure) 
Piclo Flex pay-as-bid  








phase 1: pay-as-bid 
(with regulated prices), 
phase 2: pay-as-clear 
yes (Phase 1) 
phase 1: utilisation, 
phase 2: utilisation, 
availability (reserva-
tion). Regulated 
price up to 
£300/MWh (com-
bined) in phase 1 
optional, phase 




Using EVs as 
VPP Resource 
pay-as-bid  no 
RR-FIT: (1) paid for 
both delta-kW 
(availability) (2) and 











sation. High ratio 
availability/utilisa-





ties), TSO/DSO pay a 
spread (difference be-
tween buy and sell or-
der) 
no dispatch (utilisation) optional 











(learn and forecast 
household consumption 
and generation) 
significant increase in 
average customer dis-
patch power due to VPP 
dispatch 
(1) need of accurate short-term forecast-
ing of customer demand to ensure opti-
misation of battery dispatch, (2) need to 
investigate no matching between ac-






casting tool (developed 
by GE&Enedis) 
(1) the best way to re-
ward residential cus-
tomers via a reduction 
in energy bill, (2) among 
the first DSOs in testing 
flexibility from gas cus-
tomers 
(1) flexibility price set by Enedis for 
flexibility (€ 24/kW/year) is too low to 
encourage FP participation, (2) need to 
combine flexibility with other services 




Smart Grid Hub (a sin-
gle use of DERMS) 
(1) overall curtailments 
can be reduced up to 4% 
due to higher precision 
and finer granularity, 
(2) use of smart flex-
control mechanism 
(1) no clear rules regarding activation of 
interruptible loads and the provision of 
flexibility services via in front of the me-





ALF platform, smart 
meter gateway (SMGW) 
(1) identification of two 
products: short term, 
long term, (2) smart me-
ters as an enabler to 
legal and regulatory boundary condi-
tions have been essential to create the 
platform concept 








DERMS (DSO), PAS 
(NGESO) 
(1) procurement of RP 
from DER by NGESO, 
(2) coordination TSO-
DSO 
long delay implementation due to inte-




three different channels 
to procure flexibility 
(1) there is still lack of competition in 
many CMZs: in the latest tender all con-
tracts (94.8 MW) were awarded on a 





(1) first DNO in procur-
ing flexibility in LV 
sites, (2) long-term cer-
tainty of delivery 
  
Piclo Flex 
online energy trading 
marketplace 
(1) national platform 
(involves several DSOs), 
(2) neutral and inde-
pendent marketplace  
Viability of Piclo’s current business 




ing solution with identi-
fication of constraints 
simultaneous procure-
ment of flexibility ser-
vices by WPD and 
NGESO using the same 
pool of resources 
(1) Phase 1: large variation in delivering 
between providers (2) Phase 2 prices 
were still close to £300/MWh even 








(1) VPP (V2G) to sup-




nical, V2G business 
model) 
(1) in the current solution EVs are con-
trolled site by site with no possibility of 
switching capacity (use of unused EV 
due to disconnection of other EV), how-
ever this will be tested in the next year, 
(2) EV battery aging analysis is required 




testing different ways to 
procure flexibility, GO-
PACS is the next step 
(1) securing participants and aggrega-
tors, (2) issues for controlling whole ca-
pacity, (3) flexibility from cooling less 




(1) national platform 
(involves several DSOs 
and TSO), (2) interaction 
with intraday market, 
(3) use of IDCONS 





(1) integrated within ex-
isting markets, (2) flexi-
bility is available for all 
the parties 
to ensure transparency the platform 
should be operated by an independent 
neutral party 
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